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Abstract	
This	 paper	 analyzes	 responsibility	 attributions	 for	 outcomes	 of	
collective	decision	making	processes.	In	particular,	we	ask	if	decision	
makers	are	blamed	for	being	pivotal	if	they	implement	an	unpopular	
outcome	in	a	sequential	voting	process.	We	conduct	an	experimental	
voting	 game	 in	which	 decision	makers	 vote	 about	 the	 allocation	 of	
money	between	themselves	and	recipients	without	voting	rights.	We	
measure	 responsibility	 attributions	 for	 voting	decisions	by	 eliciting	
the	 monetary	 punishment	 that	 recipients	 assign	 to	 individual	
decision	makers.	We	find	that	pivotal	decision	makers	are	punished	
significantly	more	for	an	unpopular	voting	outcome	than	non‐pivotal	
decision	makers.	Our	data	also	suggest	that	some	voters	avoid	being	
pivotal	by	voting	strategically	in	order	to	delegate	the	pivotal	vote	to	
subsequent	decision	makers.		
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“As	soon	as	a	majority	has	voted	for	it,	it	is	declared	passed,	and	the	member		
who	voted	last	is	given	credit	for	having	passed	it.”	–	Shapley	and	Shubik1	
	
1. Introduction	
Many	 economic	 and	 political	 decisions	 are	 taken	 collectively.	 For	 example,	 boards	
commonly	 make	 decisions	 about	 business	 strategies	 in	 firms,	 committees	 of	 experts	
decide	on	interest	rate	policies	in	central	banks,	and	coalition	governments	often	enact	
laws	 in	democratic	 countries.	 This	paper	 analyzes	how	people	 affected	by	 a	 collective	
decision,	 such	 as	 workers,	 shareholders,	 or	 electorates,	 attribute	 responsibly	 for	 the	
decision	 outcome	 to	 individual	 members	 of	 the	 collective	 decision	 making	 entity.	
Understanding	responsibility	attribution	for	collective	decisions	is	of	relevance	because	
it	 can,	 for	 example,	 affect	 shareholders’	willingness	 to	 extend	 a	manager’s	 contract	 or	
influence	a	political	party’s	prospects	of	reelection.		
Collective	decisions	are	often	reached	by	a	vote	among	the	decision	makers	and	
the	 voting	process	 is	 often	 transparent.	 For	 example,	 the	Bank	of	 England’s	Monetary	
Policy	 Committee	 reveals	 its	 members’	 voting	 decisions	 and	 explicitly	 states	 that	 the	
“decision	goes	to	the	majority	and	there	is	no	attempt	to	arrive	at	a	consensus:	members	
are	 individually	accountable	 for	 their	decisions”	(see	also	Bank	of	England,	2005).	The	
minutes	of	the	U.S.	Federal	Reserve	Open	Market	Committee	are	published	as	well	(Levy,	
2007).2		
In	 this	 paper,	 we	 focus	 on	 analyzing	 responsibility	 attribution	 for	 outcomes	 of	
collective	 decisions	 reached	 by	 a	 transparent	 voting	 process.	 In	 particular,	 we	 ask	 if	
decision	makers	are	blamed	for	being	pivotal	 if	they	implement	an	unpopular	outcome	
in	 a	 sequential	 voting	 process.	 This	 question	 is	 of	 interest	 also	 in	 light	 of	 the	 above	
																																																								
1	Shapley	and	Shubik	(1954),	p.	788.	
2	 Both	 the	 Monetary	 Policy	 Committee	 and	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 Open	 Market	 Committee	 publish	
individual	votes,	and	the	latter	also	reveal	the	order	of	votes,	namely:	first	chairman,	than	vice	chairman,	
then	the	other	members	in	alphabetical	order	(see	also	Gerlach‐Kristen	and	Meade,	2011).	
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quotation	 from	 Shapley	 and	 Shubik	 (1954)	 who	 introduced	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 pivotal	
voter	in	a	collective	decision	making	process	“is	given	credit,”	i.e.,	is	held	responsible	for	
having	 passed	 the	 decision.	 Hence,	 our	 paper	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 test	 of	 their	
proposition.		
We	 employ	 an	 incentivized	 laboratory	 experiment	 to	 address	 our	 research	
question.	In	the	experiment,	there	are	groups	of	six	subjects.	Three	subjects	have	voting	
rights	 and	 decide	 sequentially	 and	 observably	 whether	 to	 implement	 an	 equal	 or	 an	
unequal	allocation	of	money	among	themselves	and	the	other	three	subjects,	who	have	
no	voting	rights.	The	equal	allocation	gives	 the	same	amount	of	money	 to	all	 subjects,	
whereas	 the	 unequal	 allocation	 increases	 the	 monetary	 payoff	 of	 the	 subjects	 with	
voting	 rights	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 those	 without	 voting	 rights.	 A	 simple	 majority	 rule	
applies.	 After	 the	 vote,	 subjects	 without	 voting	 rights	 can	 assign	 costly	 punishment	
points	to	the	voters.	We	interpret	the	assignment	of	punishment	points	as	a	measure	of	
responsibility	attribution.		
Our	main	finding	is	that	subjects	attribute	significantly	more	responsibility	to	the	
pivotal	voter	than	to	the	other	voters.	The	result	holds	even	if	we	control	for	standard	
punishment	 motives	 such	 as	 outcome	 based	 fairness	 (e.g.,	 Fehr	 and	 Schmidt,	 1999;	
Bolton	 and	 Ockenfels,	 2000),	 unkind	 intentions	 (e.g.,	 Rabin,	 1993;	 Dufwenberg	 and	
Kirchsteiger,	 2004),	 or	 the	 interaction	 of	 outcomes	 and	 intentions	 (Falk	 and	
Fischbacher,	 2006).	Our	 data	 further	 suggest	 that	 about	 one‐fifth	 of	 those	 voters	who	
reveal	 their	 preference	 for	 the	 unequal	 allocation	when	 their	 vote	 as	 the	 last	 voter	 is	
decisive	vote	for	the	equal	allocation	if	it	is	possible	to	“delegate”	the	pivotal	vote	to	the	
subsequent	voter.3	
																																																								
3	A	vote	by	the	third	voter	is	decisive	if	the	first	two	voters	fail	to	reach	a	majority.		
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Our	 study	 is	 closely	 related	 to	 recent	 experimental	work	 in	political	 science	by	
Duch	et	al.	(2015),	who	also	examine	responsibility	attributions	for	collective	decisions.	
They	 consider	 a	 setting	 that,	 like	 ours,	 is	 akin	 to	 a	 collective	 dictator	 game	 with	
punishment.	 Their	 design,	 however,	 is	 different	 in	 two	 important	 ways.	 First,	 they	
consider	a	simultaneous	voting	procedure,	while	we	focus	on	sequential	voting.	Second,	
one	 decision	maker	 has	 proposal	 power	 and	 decision	makers	 have	weighted	 votes	 in	
their	 design,	while	 the	 voters	 in	 our	 design	 are	 symmetric	 (apart	 from	 the	 sequential	
order	 of	 voting).	 Duch	 et	 al.’s	 main	 finding	 is	 that	 the	 decision	 maker	 with	 proposal	
power	and	the	one	with	the	largest	voting	share	incur	the	most	punishment	in	case	of	an	
unequal	allocation.	The	sequential	voting	procedure	in	our	experiment	renders	the	role	
of	pivotality	more	salient.	Our	work	thus	complements	Duch	et	al.’s	findings	by	revealing	
the	 importance	 of	 the	 pivotal	 vote	 for	 responsibility	 attribution	 in	 collective	 decision	
making.	
Our	paper	also	contributes	to	the	political	science	 literature	that	does	not	 focus	
on	collective	decision	making	in	particular	but	on	responsibility	attribution	 in	general.	
In	 this	 literature,	 the	attribution	of	credit	or	blame	has	been	related	to	the	power	of	a	
decision	maker	(see	e.g.	Banzhaf,	1964;	Penrose,	1946;	Shapley	and	Shubik,	1954),	the	
number	 of	 veto	 players	 (Tsebelis,	 2011)	 and	 governing	 party	 size	 (see	 e.g.	 Anderson,	
1995;	Lewis‐Beck,	1990),	and	to	the	extent	to	which	unified	control	of	policymaking	by	
incumbent	governments	is	possible	(Powell	and	Whitten,	1993).	Similarly,	Finer	(1975),	
Alesina	 (1997),	 Lijphart	 (2012,	 12),	 and	 Franzese	 Jr	 (2002,	 12)	 argue	 that	 coalition	
governments	 provide	 less	 potential	 for	 electoral	 accountability	 than	 single	 party	
governments,	and	Duch	and	Stevenson	(2008,	author‐year	)	report	that	voters	are	more	
likely	to	attribute	economic	outcomes	to	single‐party	majority	cabinets	than	to	coalition	
governments.		
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Finally,	 the	 results	 of	 our	 study	 contribute	 to	 the	 economics	 literature	 on	 the	
importance	of	pivotality	in	markets	and	organizations	(see	e.g.	Falk	and	Szech,	2013),	as	
well	as	to	the	literature	on	delegation	of	unpopular	decisions	(e.g.,	Hamman	et	al.	2010,	
Coffman	2011,	Bartling	and	Fischbacher,	2012).	Falk	and	Szech	(2013)	analyze	how	the	
decision	 maker’s	 perception	 of	 her	 own	 pivotality	 affects	 the	 likelihood	 of	 taking	 an	
immoral	decision	(the	decision	to	kill	a	mouse)	in	a	trading	environment.	They	find	that	
the	 likelihood	 of	 killing	 the	mouse	 is	 higher	 if	 a	 decision	maker’s	 perception	 of	 being	
pivotal	 is	 lower	 and	 that	 on	 the	 aggregate	 level,	 many	 more	 mice	 are	 killed	 in	 a	
treatment	where	pivotality	is	diffused.	Our	study	shows	that	not	only	the	perception	of	
the	pivotality	of	the	own	decision	matters	for	choice.	We	show	that	more	responsibility	
and	blame	is	attributed	to	pivotal	than	to	non‐pivotal	decision	makers,	which	in	turn	can	
affect	the	decision	makers’	choices.	Bartling	and	Fischbacher	(2012)	demonstrate	that	it	
is	 possible	 to	 shift	 the	 blame	 for	 an	 unpopular	 decision	 by	 delegating	 the	 choice	 to	
another	person,	and	that	many	people	do	so.	The	main	result	of	our	current	paper	shows	
that	it	is	also	possible	in	the	context	of	collective	decision	making	to	shift	some	blame	by	
“delegating”	 the	 pivotal	 vote,	 and	 the	 data	 suggest	 that	 some	 voters	make	 use	 of	 that	
option.		
The	 remainder	 of	 our	 paper	 is	 organized	 as	 follows.	 Section	 2	 explains	 the	
experimental	 design	 and	 procedures.	 We	 discuss	 the	 punishment	 predictions	 of	
standard	 social	 preference	 models	 in	 economics,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 role	 of	 pivotality	 for	
punishment	 in	 Section	 3.	 Section	 4	 reports	 our	 experimental	 results.	 Section	 5	
concludes.		
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2. Experimental	Design	
We	implemented	a	sequential	voting	game	with	punishment.	Three	“voters”	and	 three	
“receivers”	 form	 a	 group.	 The	 voters	 decide	 on	 the	 allocation	 of	 a	 total	 of	 30	 points	
among	 the	 six	 group	members,	 using	 a	 simple	 majority	 rule.	 There	 are	 two	 possible	
allocations.	The	unequal	allocation	gives	9	points	to	each	of	the	voters	and	only	1	point	
to	 each	 of	 the	 receivers	 (9,9,9;1,1,1).	 The	 equal	 allocation	 distributes	 the	 30	 points	
evenly	 among	 the	 six	 group	members	 (5,5,5;5,5,5).	 Importantly,	 the	 voters	 cast	 their	
votes	sequentially.	The	other	voters	and	receivers	of	the	group	are	able	to	observe	both	
the	sequence	of	the	decisions	and	the	decisions	themselves.	First,	Voter	1	votes	for	one	
of	the	two	allocations.	Then	Voter	2	observes	Voter	1’s	action	and	votes	herself.	Finally,	
Voter	 3	 casts	 her	 vote,	 knowing	 the	 choices	 of	 Voters	 1	 and	 2.	 Abstentions	 are	 not	
possible.	Figure	1	illustrates	the	decision	tree.		
	
Figure	1:	Voters’	Choices	and	Resulting	Allocations	for	Voters	and	Receivers	
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The	 three	 receivers	 first	 observe	 the	 sequence	 of	 the	 votes	 and	 thus	 also	 the	
voting	 outcome.	 One	 randomly	 selected	 receiver	 then	 has	 the	 option	 to	 punish	
individual	 voters	by	deducting	points.	Punishing	 is	 costly	 for	 the	 receivers.	A	 receiver	
incurs	a	fixed	cost	of	one	point	to	be	able	to	deduct	up	to	seven	points	from	the	voters.	
The	seven	punishment	points	can	be	assigned	to	a	single	voter	or	they	can	be	distributed	
among	two	or	all	three	voters,	but	it	is	not	possible	to	reduce	a	voter’s	payoff	below	zero.		
The	players’	payoff	functions	are	summarized	as	follows.	A	voter	either	receives	
nine	 or	 five	 points,	 depending	 on	 the	 chosen	 allocation;	 furthermore,	 he	might	 incur	
punishment	points	 from	the	 randomly	chosen	receiver.	The	randomly	chosen	receiver	
gets	 either	 one	 or	 five	 points,	 depending	 on	 the	 chosen	 allocation,	 minus	 the	 cost	 of	
punishment	(one	point)	if	she	deducts	at	least	one	point	from	the	voters.	The	two	other	
receivers	get	a	payoff	of	either	five	or	one	point,	depending	on	the	chosen	allocation.		
The	 game	 was	 played	 one‐shot	 and	 we	 used	 the	 strategy	 method	 for	 both	
receivers	and	voters.	Each	receiver	decided,	in	a	randomized	order,	for	each	of	the	eight	
possible	 voting	 histories	 (see	 the	 eight	 end‐nodes	 in	 Figure	 1)	 how	 to	 punish	 the	
individual	voters.	Only	after	the	receivers	made	all	eight	decisions,	each	receiver	learned	
whether	or	not	she	was	the	randomly	selected	receiver	who	could	punish,	and	she	knew	
that	her	punishment	decisions	for	the	realized	situation	were	binding.4	Voters	decided	at	
seven	decision	nodes,	namely	as	first	as	Voter	1,	then	as	Voter	2,	and	finally	as	Voter	3.	
In	the	role	of	Voters	2	and	3,	subjects	make	decisions	for	every	possible	pre‐play	history	
(see	the	seven	decision	nodes	in	Figure	1).	The	respective	pre‐play	histories	were	shown	
in	a	randomized	order.	Voters	knew	that	their	choices	were	binding	and	that	they	would	
																																																								
4	 Brandts	 and	 Charness	 (2011,	 author‐year	 )	 provide	 a	 survey	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 use	 of	 the	 strategy	
method	on	punishment	decisions	in	experiments	and	find	no	case	were	a	treatment	effect	that	is	detected	
using	 the	 strategy	method	 vanishes	when	 the	 direct	 response	method	 is	 used.	 The	 use	 of	 the	 strategy	
method	can	thus	be	considered	as	the	more	conservative	test	in	our	context.	
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learn	their	randomly	assigned	role	as	Voter	1,	Voter	2,	or	Voter	3	only	after	they	decided	
on	all	seven	decision	nodes.5		
2.1	General	Procedures	
Before	 the	subjects	entered	 the	 lab,	 they	randomly	drew	a	place	card	 that	specified	at	
which	computer	terminal	to	sit.	The	terminal	number	determined	both	a	subject’s	role	
(voter	 or	 receiver)	 and	 the	 group	matching.	 After	 entering	 the	 lab,	 subjects	 received	
paper	 copies	 of	 the	 instructions	 explaining	 the	 game	 at	 their	 assigned	 terminals.	 The	
subjects’	 instructions	 included	 comprehension	 questions	 that	 had	 to	 be	 answered	
correctly	 before	 a	 session	 began.	We	 used	 a	 neutral	 framing	 for	 voters	 and	 receivers	
(Players	A	and	B),	as	well	as	for	punishment	(deduction	points),	and	for	the	labeling	of	
the	 two	 allocations	 (Allocations	 1	 and	 2).	 An	 experimenter	 read	 a	 summary	 of	 the	
instructions	aloud	to	ensure	common	knowledge	about	the	game.	An	English	translation	
of	the	original	German	instructions	can	be	found	in	the	Online	Appendix.		
The	data	were	 collected	 in	 four	 sessions	 in	 two	 consecutive	weeks	 in	November	
and	December	2012.	144	 subjects	participated	 in	 total.	 Each	 subject	 participated	only	
once.	The	sessions	took	place	at	the	decision	laboratory	of	the	Department	of	Economics	
at	the	University	of	Zurich.	Participants	were	students	from	the	University	of	Zurich	and	
the	 Swiss	 Federal	 Institute	 of	 Technology	 in	 Zurich.	 The	 experiment	 was	 conducted	
using	z‐Tree	(Fischbacher,	2007),	and	we	used	ORSEE	(Greiner,	2004)	for	recruiting.	
The	experiment	took	about	75	minutes.	Each	experimental	point	was	converted	to	
CHF	3.00	at	the	end	of	the	experiment.	The	subjects	earned	about	CHF	26.30	(about	$28	
																																																								
5	Although	we	used	the	strategy	method,	we	made	the	sequential	voting	procedure	very	clear.	For	each	of	
the	possible	situations,	each	voting	decision	was	reflected	by	an	individual	update	of	the	computer	screen.	
For	example,	the	third	voter	was	informed	about	the	preceding	voters’	decisions	in	the	sequential	order	
and	had	to	confirm	the	receipt	of	each	piece	of	information	by	clicking	a	button.	Equivalently,	a	receiver	
had	to	click	through	a	sequence	of	screens	showing	the	sequential	order	of	the	three	voters’	decisions	(i.e.,	
the	path	through	the	game	tree)	before	making	her	punishment	decision	for	a	given	voting	outcome.	See	
the	experimental	instructions	in	the	Online	Appendix	for	more	details.	
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at	the	time	of	the	experiment),	which	included	a	show‐up	fee	of	CHF	12.	Earnings	were	
paid	privately	to	ensure	the	anonymity	of	the	decisions.	
	
3. Punishment	Motives		
If	 all	 subjects	 are	 purely	 self‐interested,	 the	 receivers	 will	 not	 incur	 the	 cost	 of	
punishment,	 irrespective	of	 the	resulting	allocation	and	 the	voting	sequence.	 It	 is	well	
known,	 however,	 that	 the	pure	 self‐interest	model	 does	not	 always	 accurately	predict	
many	subjects’	behavior.	 In	 this	 section,	we	discuss	punishment	motives	based	on	 the	
most	 widely	 used	 economic	 theories	 of	 social	 preferences.	 We	 include	 punishment	
predictions	 of	 social	 preference	 models	 based	 on	 outcomes	 (e.g.	 Fehr	 and	 Schmidt,	
1999;	 Bolton	 and	 Ockenfels,	 2000),	 intentions	 (Rabin,	 1993;	 Dufwenberg	 and	
Kirchsteiger,	 2004),	 and	 the	 interaction	 of	 outcomes	 and	 intentions	 (Falk	 and	
Fischbacher,	 2006).	 In	 addition,	 we	 consider	 “choice”	 (i.e.,	 vote)	 as	 one	 particular	
punishment	motive	because	it	strikes	us	as	a	natural	heuristic	to	assign	punishment	in	
our	 context.	 Finally—being	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 paper—we	 discuss	 the	 potential	
punishment	motive	“pivotality.”6		
3.1. Outcome‐based	models	of	social	preferences	
Outcome	 based	models	 of	 social	 preferences,	 e.g.,	 Fehr	 and	 Schmidt	 (1999)	 or	 Bolton	
and	Ockenfels	 (2000),	 assume	 that	 some	 people	 dislike	 unequal	 allocations.	 Inequity‐
averse	receivers	might	thus	be	willing	to	incur	the	cost	of	punishment	to	reduce	payoff	
differences.	This	model	class	predicts	no	punishment	if	the	equal	allocation	prevails	but	
																																																								
6	 The	 predictions	 of	 the	 formal	 economic	 models	 relate	 to	 predictions	 by	 concepts	 included	 in	
psychological	attribution	theories,	such	as	the	concept	of	“controllability”	(Weiner,	1979),	i.e.,	the	extent	
to	which	 a	 person	was	 in	 control	 of	 causing	 a	 particular	 outcome.	 In	 the	Online	 Appendix,	we	 provide	
three	 conceptualizations	 of	 Weiner’s	 idea	 of	 controllability	 and	 analyze	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 these	
conceptualizations	 explain	 the	 punishment	 decisions	 observed	 in	 our	 data.	 In	 line	with	 the	 concept	 of	
controllability,	we	find	higher	punishment	if	an	unfair	action	is	chosen	in	a	situation	with	higher	control.	
We	thank	an	anonymous	referee	for	suggesting	this	analysis.		
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predicts	positive	punishment	otherwise.	Importantly,	the	predicted	punishment	neither	
depends	on	individual	choices	(votes)	nor	on	the	sequence	of	voting.		
3.2. Choice	of	the	unequal	allocation		
Voting	 for	 the	 unequal	 allocation	 could	 be	 perceived	 as	 a	 stated	 preference	 for	 the	
unequal	 allocation	 and	 thus	 as	 blameworthy.	 This	would	predict	 no	punishment	 for	 a	
voter	who	opted	for	the	equal	allocation	but	some	punishment	for	a	voter	who	opted	for	
the	 unequal	 allocation	 (even	 if	 this	 voter	 can	 no	 longer	 influence	 the	 outcome).	 The	
punishment	motive	“unequal	choice”	can	be	seen	as	a	naïve	version	of	the	punishment	
motive	“intentionality,”	which	we	discuss	next.	
3.3. Intention‐based	models	of	social	preferences	
Intention‐based	 models	 of	 social	 preferences,	 e.g.,	 Rabin	 (1993)	 or	 Dufwenberg	 and	
Kirchsteiger	 (2004),	 assume	 that	 people	 are	 willing	 to	 incur	 costs	 to	 punish	 unkind	
actions,	 irrespective	 of	 the	 resulting	 allocation.	 In	 these	models,	 the	 unkindness	 of	 an	
action	is	measured	by	comparing	the	chosen	action	with	the	possible	alternative	actions.	
In	our	game,	voting	for	the	unequal	allocation	is	an	intentionally	unkind	action	if	a	voter	
is	still	able	to	affect	the	outcome	of	the	voting	process.	If	Voters	1	and	2	already	decided	
the	vote,	Voter	3’s	vote	 is	 irrelevant	and	therefore	classified	as	a	neutral	action,	 i.e.,	as	
neither	kind	nor	unkind.	Voting	 for	 the	equal	allocation,	while	still	being	able	 to	affect	
the	 outcome,	 is	 a	 kind	 action.	 The	 notion	 of	 intention‐based	 reciprocity	 predicts	 no	
punishment	for	neutral	or	kind	voters.	
3.4. Outcome	and	intention	
Falk	 and	 Fischbacher	 (2006)	 combine	 the	 punishment	 motives	 “outcome”	 and	
“intention.”	In	their	model,	people	are	willing	to	punish	decision	makers	who	implement	
unequal	 allocations,	 and	punishment	 is	 even	 stronger	 if	 the	decision	maker’s	 action	 is	
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intentional.	 In	 our	 context,	 punishment	 for	 a	 voter	 is	 thus	 predicted	 only	 if	 both	 the	
unequal	allocation	results	and	the	voter’s	intention	is	unkind.		
3.5. Pivotality	
The	central	hypothesis	in	our	paper	is	that	being	pivotal	is	regarded	as	carrying	special	
responsibility	for	the	resulting	voting	outcome.	Therefore,	the	prediction	of	the	notion	of	
pivotality	is	that	the	pivotal	voter	will	be	punished	more	than	the	other	voters,	given	the	
unequal	outcome	results.	
	
4. Results	
4.1. Pivotality	and	Punishment	
Our	main	research	question	is	whether	receivers	blame	the	pivotal	voter	more	than	the	
non‐pivotal	voters	if	the	unequal	allocation	is	chosen.	We	investigate	this	question	using	
the	 punishment	 pattern	 as	 a	measure	 of	 the	 assignment	 of	 blame.	 Table	 1	 shows	 the	
average	punishment	levels	for	the	first,	second,	and	third	voter	separately	for	each	of	the	
eight	possible	voting	outcomes.	The	table	shows	that	average	punishment	is	higher	for	
the	pivotal	voter	(shown	 in	boldface)	 than	 for	 the	non‐pivotal	voters	 in	all	 four	voting	
sequences	in	which	the	unequal	allocation	results.	For	example,	the	first	row	of	Table	1	
shows	the	voting	sequence	“u‐u‐u,”	in	which	all	voters	opted	for	the	unequal	allocation.	
Voter	2	is	the	pivotal	voter	and	she	is	punished	by	1.85	points	on	average.	Voter	1,	the	
first	intentionally	unkind	voter,	is	punished	by	1.5	points	and	Voter	3,	whose	vote	could	
not	 make	 a	 difference,	 is	 punished	 by	 0.86	 points	 on	 average.	 The	 two	 rightmost	
columns	 in	 Table	 1	 show	 the	 significance	 levels	 for	 the	 comparisons	 between	 the	
punishment	for	the	pivotal	voter	and	the	non‐pivotal	voters,	either	taking	the	average	of	
both	 other	 voters	 as	 the	 comparison	 group	 (“all	 voters”)	 or	 the	 other	 intentionally	
unkind	voter	only	(“unkind	voter”).	The	table	shows	that	the	difference	in	punishment	
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between	the	pivotal	and	the	average	of	 the	two	non‐pivotal	players	 is	significant	 in	all	
four	voting	sequences.	While	average	punishment	for	the	pivotal	voter	is	higher	than	for	
the	 non‐pivotal	 unkind	 voter	 in	 all	 four	 voting	 sequences,	 the	 differences	 in	 average	
punishment	between	the	pivotal	voter	and	the	intentionally	unkind	voter	are	significant	
only	in	the	two	situations	in	which	the	pivotal	voter	is	the	last	voter.7		
Table	1:	Average	punishment	in	the	eight	possible	voting	sequences	
  Average punishment  Pivotal vs. Non-Pivotal 
Allocation 
Voting 
Sequence Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3  all voters unkind voter 
unequal u-u-u 1.5 1.85 0.86  p<0.001 p=0.294 
u-u-e 1.86 1.92 0.26  p<0.001 p=0.960 
u-e-u 1.68 0.07 2.39  p<0.001 p=0.006 
e-u-u 0.11 1.83 2.33  p<0.001 p=0.012 
equal u-e-e 1.33 0.10 0.08  - - 
e-u-e 0.17 1.43 0.08  - - 
e-e-u 0.06 0.03 0.92  - - 
e-e-e 0.08 0.07 0.03  - - 
Notes:	 “u”	 denotes	 a	 vote	 for	 the	 unequal	 allocation;	 “e”	 denotes	 a	 vote	 for	 the	 equal	
allocation.	 The	 punishment	 for	 the	 pivotal	 voter	 is	written	 in	 boldface.	 The	 two	 rightmost	
columns	 show	 p‐values	 of	 Wilcoxon	 signed	 rank	 tests	 comparing	 the	 punishment	 for	 the	
pivotal	voter	to	the	punishment	for	the	two	other	voters	(“all	voters”)	and	to	the	punishment	
for	the	other	intentionally	unkind	voter	only	(“unkind	voter”).	
	
In	 Figure	 2,	we	 show	 the	 average	 punishment	 for	 all	 voters	when	 the	 unequal	
outcome	 occurred.	We	 aggregate	 punishment	 based	 on	whether	 a	 voter’s	 choice	 was	
unequal	 (“Choice	 unequal”),	whether	 a	 voter	was	 revealed	 to	 be	 intentionally	 unkind,	
i.e.,	 the	 voter	 opts	 for	 the	 unequal	 outcome	 while	 the	 voting	 outcome	 is	 still	 open	
(“Intention	 unkind”),	 or	 whether	 the	 voter	 was	 pivotal,	 i.e.,	 completed	 the	 minimum	
winning	coalition	necessary	to	implement	the	unequal	outcome	(“Pivotal”).	Note	that	a	
voter’s	 intention	 can	 only	 be	 unkind	 if	 her	 choice	 is	 unequal,	 and	 a	 voter	 can	 only	 be	
																																																								
7	Throughout	the	paper,	we	only	consider	being	pivotal	for	the	unequal	allocation	and	thus	neglect	the	fact	
that	the	second	voter	who	opts	for	the	equal	allocation	after	the	first	voter	opted	for	the	equal	allocation	is	
pivotal	for	the	equal	allocation.	Little	punishment	occurs	in	case	of	the	equal	allocation,	and	we	do	not	find	
that	voters	who	are	pivotal	 for	 the	equal	allocation	are	again	punished	significantly	 less	 than	 the	other	
voters.	
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pivotal	 for	 the	 unequal	 allocation	 if	 she	 is	 intentionally	 unkind.	 We	 thus	 have	 four	
categories	of	voters,	as	shown	in	Figure	2.		
(1):	Voters	who	did	not	choose	the	unequal	allocation	
(2):	Voters	who	chose	the	unequal	allocation	but	could	no	longer	affect	the	outcome		
(3):	Voters	who	chose	the	unequal	allocation	when	they	could	still	affect	the	outcome,	so	
that	their	action	is	intentionally	unkind,	but	who	were	not	pivotal		
(4):	Voters	who	chose	 the	unequal	 allocation	when	 they	 could	 still	 affect	 the	outcome	
and	who	were	pivotal.	
Table	 2	 summarizes	 how	 the	 voters	 are	 placed	 into	 these	 four	 categories	 in	 the	 four	
different	voting	sequences	that	result	in	the	unequal	outcome.	
Table	2:	Voting	sequences	and	placement	of	voters	into	categories	in	Figure	2 
Voting	Sequence	 Voter	1	 Voter	2	 Voter	3	
u‐u‐u	 (3)	 (4)	 (2)	
u‐u‐e	 (3)	 (4)	 (1)	
u‐e‐u	 (3)	 (1)	 (4)	
e‐u‐u	 (1)	 (3)	 (4)	
Notes:	The	table	shows	which	voters	are	placed	into	the	four	categories	(1)‐(4)	shown	in	Figure	
2	 for	 the	different	voting	sequences	 that	result	 in	 the	unequal	allocation.	For	example,	 the	 top	
row	 shows	 the	 voting	 sequence	 in	 which	 all	 voters	 voted	 for	 the	 unequal	 allocation	 (u‐u‐u).	
Voter	1	chose	the	unequal	allocation,	could	still	affect	the	outcome	so	that	the	unequal	choice	is	
intentionally	unkind,	but	was	not	pivotal.	Voter	1	thus	falls	into	category	(3)	in	Figure	2.	Voter	2	
chose	 the	 unequal	 allocation,	 was	 intentionally	 unkind	 and	 pivotal.	 Voter	 2	 thus	 falls	 into	
category	(4).	Voter	3	chose	the	unequal	allocation	but	could	no	longer	affect	the	outcome,	so	she	
was	neither	intentionally	unkind	nor	pivotal.	Voter	3	thus	falls	into	category	(2).		
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Figure	2:	Average	punishment	for	voters	 if	the	unequal	allocation	results.	The	bars	show	
the	average	punishment	for	(1)	voters	who	voted	for	the	equal	allocation,	(2)	voters	who	voted	
for	the	unequal	allocation	but	could	not	affect	the	outcome	as	 it	was	decided	already,	(3)	non‐
pivotal	 voters	who	 intentionally	 voted	 for	 the	 unequal	 allocation,	 and	 (4)	 pivotal	 voters.	 The	
error	bars	show	standard	errors	of	the	means.	
	
Figure	2	shows	that	average	punishment	is	lowest	for	the	voters	who	vote	for	the	
equal	allocation.	It	amounts	to	0.15	points	and	is	highly	significantly	different	from	the	
other	 three	 groups	 (Wilcoxon	 signed	 rank	 tests	 based	 on	 average	 punishment	 per	
subject,	N=	72,	p‐values<0.001).	The	voters	who	chose	the	unequal	allocation	but	could	
no	 longer	affect	the	outcome	(because	Voters	1	and	2	opted	for	the	unequal	allocation	
already)	 were	 punished	 by	 0.86	 points	 on	 average,	 which	 is	 also	 highly	 significantly	
different	 from	 the	 other	 groups	 (Wilcoxon	 signed	 rank	 tests	 based	 on	 average	
punishment	 per	 subject,	N=	 72,	 p‐values<0.001).	 Finally,	 non‐pivotal	 but	 intentionally	
unkind	voters	are	punished	on	average	by	1.72	points,	while	pivotal	voters	are	punished	
by	2.12	points	on	average.	This	difference,	as	well,	 is	statistically	significant	(Wilcoxon	
signed	 rank	 test	 based	 on	 average	 punishment	 per	 subject,	 N=	 72,	 p=0.032).	 We	
summarize	our	findings	in	the	following:		
Result	 1	 (Pivotality	 and	 Punishment):	 On	 average,	 the	 pivotal	 voter	 is	
punished	the	most.	
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Choice	unequal	:
Intention	unkind:
Pivotal:
(1)
no
no
no
(2)
yes
no
no
(3)
yes
yes
no
(4)
yes
yes
yes
14	
	
4.2. An	Econometric	Comparison	of	Different	Punishment	Motives		
In	 this	 subsection,	we	provide	an	econometric	 comparison	of	 the	punishment	motives	
that	we	discussed	in	Section	3.	We	first	compare	the	explanatory	power	of	the	different	
motives	 in	 isolation.	 Then,	 we	 consider	 all	 motives	 simultaneously	 to	 analyze	 if	
pivotality	has	explanatory	power	on	top	of	the	other	punishment	motives.	
We	show	the	results	of	the	econometric	analysis	in	Table	3.	Note	that	all	decisions	
are	 always	 included	 in	 this	 analysis,	 including	 the	 decision	 resulting	 in	 the	 equal	
outcome.	Regression	(1)	shows	that	the	punishment	for	voters	is	significantly	higher	if	
the	unequal	allocation	results	(average	punishment	of	1.389	points)	compared	to	if	the	
equal	allocation	results	(average	punishment	of	0.365	points).	Regression	(2)	shows	that	
those	 voters	 who	 vote	 for	 the	 unequal	 allocation	 are	 punished	 significantly	 more	
(average	 punishment	 of	 1.659	 points)	 than	 those	 voters	 who	 vote	 for	 the	 equal	
allocation	 (average	 punishment	 of	 0.095	 points).	 Regression	 (3)	 reveals	 that	 a	 voter	
with	an	unkind	 intention	 is	punished	significantly	more	(average	punishment	of	1.812	
points)	 than	 a	 voter	 with	 a	 neutral	 or	 kind	 intention	 (average	 punishment	 of	 0.208	
points).	 Regression	 (4)	 shows	 that	 the	 punishment	 for	 intentionally	 unkind	 voters	
whose	votes	contributed	to	the	final	implementation	of	the	unequal	allocation	(average	
punishment	of	1.920	points)	is	significantly	higher	compared	to	all	other	voters	(average	
punishment	of	0.355	points).	 Finally,	 regression	 (5)	 shows	 that	punishment	 for	voters	
who	 are	 pivotal	 for	 the	 unequal	 allocation	 (average	 punishment	 of	 2.122	 points)	 is	
significantly	higher	than	the	punishment	for	all	other	voters	(0.628	points).	
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Table	3:	An	econometric	comparison	of	different	punishment	motives	
OLS  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Outcome unequal 1.024***     0.048 
 (0.126)     (0.070) 
Choice unequal  1.564***    0.782*** 
  (0.154)    (0.137) 
Intention unkind   1.604***   0.517** 
   (0.161)   (0.196) 
Outcome unequal     1.565***  0.289 
x Intention unkind    (0.169)  (0.232) 
Pivotal     1.494*** 0.403**
     (0.180) (0.155) 
Constant 0.365*** 0.095*** 0.208*** 0.355*** 0.628*** 0.083**
 (0.067) (0.033) (0.041) (0.055) (0.065) (0.037) 
Observations 1,728 1,728 1,728 1,728 1,728 1,728 
R2 0.105 0.244 0.250 0.217 0.124 0.281
Notes:	 The	 dependent	 variable	 is	 punishment	 points	 for	 voters.	Outcome	unequal	 is	 a	 dummy	
variable	which	equals	1	if	the	unequal	allocation	is	chosen.	Choice	unequal	is	a	dummy	variable	
which	equals	1	if	a	voter	opts	for	the	unequal	allocation.	Intention	unkind	 is	a	dummy	variable	
which	equals	1	if	a	voter	opts	for	the	unequal	allocation	and	no	majority	was	reached	before	her	
vote.	Pivotal	is	a	dummy	variable	which	equals	1	if	a	voter	is	pivotal	for	the	unequal	allocation.	
Standard	errors,	clustered	on	72	individuals,	are	in	parentheses.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1		
	
The	main	 insight	 provided	 by	 the	 regression	 analysis	 in	 Table	 3	 is	 that	 all	 five	
punishment	 motives	 that	 we	 discussed	 in	 Section	 3	 make	 the	 qualitatively	 correct	
comparative‐static	 prediction	with	 respect	 to	 average	 punishment	 levels.	 To	 compare	
the	 explanatory	 power	 of	 the	 different	 motives,	 we	 can	 directly	 compare	 the	 R2	 in	
models	1	to	5.	This	is	meaningful	because	all	of	the	models	have	just	one	parameter.	We	
find	that	the	predictive	power	of	the	punishment	motive	“pivotal”	(R2=0.124	in	model	5)	
is	higher	than	the	predictive	power	of	the	motive	“outcome	unequal”	(R2=0.105	in	model	
1).	But	the	predictive	power	of	the	motives	that	take	“choice”	or	“intention”	into	account	
is	higher,	and	it	is	highest	for	the	motive	“Intention	unkind”	(R2=0.250	in	model	3).	
Finally,	we	analyze	whether	the	punishment	motive	“pivotal”	has	an	explanatory	
power	 on	 top	 of	 the	 other	 motives	 by	 combining	 all	 five	 punishment	 motives	 in	 one	
regression.	 Regression	 (6)	 in	 Table	 3	 reveals	 that	 the	 motives	 “choice	 unequal,”	
“intention	 unkind,”	 and	 “pivotal”	 all	 contribute	 to	 the	 explanation	 of	 the	 punishment	
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pattern.	 In	 particular,	 the	 dummy	 variable	 “pivotal”	 remains	 significant,	 showing	 that	
being	 pivotal	 matters	 for	 the	 assignment	 of	 blame	 even	 when	 we	 control	 for	 other	
punishment	motives.	We	summarize	our	results	in	the	following:		
	
Result	2	 (Pivotality	 vs.	 Standard	Punishment	Motives):	The	punishment	
motive	 “pivotality”	 has	 a	 significant	 explanatory	 power	 for	 average	
punishment	 levels	 even	 if	 we	 control	 for	 the	 standard	 motives	 “outcome	
unequal,”	“choice	unequal,”	“intention	unkind,”	and	the	 interaction	“outcome	
unequal	x	intention	unkind.”	
	
4.3. Voting	Behavior		
In	 this	 section,	 we	 report	 on	 the	 voters’	 behavior.	 Overall,	 we	 find	 that	 the	 unequal	
allocation	resulted	in	67.4	percent	of	the	cases.	Table	4	provides	a	detailed	overview	of	
the	voting	behavior	of	Voters	1,	2,	and	3	at	each	decision	node	and	the	expected	payoffs	
that	resulted	from	the	respective	choices.		
The	 top	 two	 rows	 of	 Table	 4	 show	 that	 58.3	 percent	 of	 all	 Voters	 1	 voted	 for	
“unequal”	and	thus	41.7	percent	for	“equal.”8	The	table	further	reveals	that	the	decision	
between	 voting	 for	 “unequal”	 and	 “equal”	 involves	 a	 tradeoff.	 Voting	 for	 “unequal”	
increases	 the	 probability	 of	 the	 unequal	 allocation	 and	 thus	 the	 expected	 number	 of	
points	before	punishment,	whereas	voting	 for	“equal”	decreases	expected	punishment.	
The	 three	 rightmost	 columns	 report	 the	 expected	 number	 of	 allocated	 points	 before	
punishment,	the	expected	punishment,	and	the	expected	payoff	(allocated	points	minus	
punishment)	of	a	particular	voting	choice	at	a	given	decision	node.	For	Voters	1,	the	gain	
from	 increasing	 the	 likelihood	 of	 implementing	 the	 unequal	 allocation	 by	 voting	 for	
“unequal”	 (8.53‐6.53=2)	 outweighs	 the	 loss	 from	 increased	 punishment	 (1.70‐
																																																								
8	The	decisions	of	 a	 subset	of	43	voters,	who	voted	 for	 the	unequal	 allocation	as	decisive	Voters	3,	 are	
shown	in	the	column	to	the	right	of	the	decisions	of	all	voters.	We	discuss	this	subset	later	in	this	section.	
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0.11=1.59),	such	that	the	expected	payoff	of	voting	for	“unequal”	(6.83)	is	larger	than	the	
expected	payoff	of	voting	for	“equal”	(6.42).		
	
Table	4:	Voting	decisions	and	expected	payoffs	at	each	decision	node	
Voter	
Voting	
sequence	
(decision	
in	bold)	
Voter	decision	[%]	 Expected	
points	
before	
punishment
Expected	
punishment	
Expected	
payoff	
All	
voters	
(n=72)	
Decisive	Voters	3	
voting	for	
“unequal”	(n=43)	
1	 u‐…	 58.3	 76.7	 8.53	 1.70	 6.83	e‐…	 41.7	 23.3	 6.53	 0.11	 6.42	
2	
u‐u‐…	 59.7	 79.1	 9	 1.90	 7.10	
u‐e‐…	 40.3	 20.9	 7.83	 0.08	 7.75	
e‐u‐…	 61.1	 81.4	 7.5	 1.68	 5.82	
e‐e‐…	 38.9	 18.6	 5	 0.07	 4.93	
3	
u‐u‐u	 22.2	 18.6	 9	 0.86	 8.14	
u‐u‐e	 77.8	 81.4	 9	 0.26	 8.74	
u‐e‐u	 70.8	 100	 9	 2.39	 6.61	
u‐e‐e	 29.2	 0	 5	 0.08	 4.92	
e‐u‐u	 62.5	 100	 9	 2.33	 6.67	
e‐u‐e	 37.5	 0	 5	 0.08	 4.92	
e‐e‐u	 1.4	 2.3	 5	 0.92	 4.08	
e‐e‐e	 98.6	 97.7	 5	 0.03	 4.97	
Notes:	“u”	denotes	a	vote	for	the	unequal	allocation;	“e”	denotes	a	vote	for	the	equal	allocation.	
	
Turning	 to	 Voters	 2,	 Table	 4	 shows	 that	 59.7	 and	 61.1	 percent	 of	 all	 Voters	 2	
voted	for	“unequal”	subsequent	to	Voter	1	voting	for	“unequal”	and	“equal,”	respectively.	
Consider	 first	 the	 situation	 in	which	Voter	 1	 voted	 for	 “unequal.”	 Voters	 2	 could	 then	
increase	 their	 expected	 payoff	 by	 voting	 for	 “equal.”	 Voting	 for	 “unequal”	 in	 that	
situation	yields	9	points	before	punishment	and	an	expected	punishment	of	1.9	points.	
Voting	for	“equal”	reduces	the	expected	number	of	points	before	punishment	(7.83)	but	
it	 also	 reduces	 the	 expected	 punishment	 (0.08).	 The	 reduction	 in	 punishment	 (1.9‐
0.08=1.82)	 thus	more	 than	 compensates	 for	 the	 reduction	 of	 the	 expected	 number	 of	
points	 before	punishment	 (9‐7.83=1.17).	 Consider	now	 the	 situation	 in	which	Voter	1	
voted	 for	 “equal.”	 The	 expected	 payoff	 for	Voters	 2	 is	 now	higher	when	 they	 vote	 for	
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“unequal.”	In	expectation,	voting	for	“unequal”	in	this	situation	yields	7.5	points	before	
punishment,	a	punishment	of	1.68	points,	and	thus	a	payoff	of	5.82	points.	By	voting	for	
“equal,”	 Voters	 2	 implement	 the	 equal	 allocation,	 i.e.,	 a	 payoff	 of	 5	 points	 before	
punishment.	 The	 expected	 payoff	 is	 thus	 lower,	 even	 though	 there	 is	 almost	 no	
punishment	(0.07)	for	Voters	2	in	that	case.			
We	 finally	 turn	 to	Voters	 3.	 Consider	 first	 the	 two	 cases	where	Voters	 1	 and	2	
opted	for	different	allocations,	such	that	Voter	3	has	the	decisive	vote.	In	these	cases,	the	
expected	 payoff	 of	 Voters	 3	 is	 higher	 if	 they	 implement	 the	 unequal	 allocation.	 The	
increase	in	the	payoff	before	punishment	(9‐5=4)	is	larger	than	the	increase	in	expected	
punishment	at	the	two	respective	decision	nodes	(2.39‐0.08=2.31	and	2.33‐0.08=2.25).	
In	both	cases,	we	find	that	the	majority	of	Voters	3	voted	for	“unequal”	(70.8	and	62.5	
percent).	 In	 the	 two	 cases	where	Voters	1	 and	2	 already	 implemented	 the	unequal	or	
equal	allocation,	Voters	3	maximize	their	expected	payoffs	by	voting	for	“equal”	because	
this	reduces	the	expected	punishment.	We	find	that	all	but	one	Voter	3	voted	for	“equal”	
when	Voters	1	and	2	implemented	the	equal	allocation.	However,	22	percent	of	Voters	3	
(16	of	72)	voted	for	“unequal”	when	Voters	1	and	2	implemented	the	unequal	allocation.	
This	latter	finding	is	surprising,	also	in	light	of	the	low‐cost	theory	of	expressive	voting	
(see	e.g.	Brennan	and	Lomasky,	1993),	which	would	predict	that	of	those	Voters	3	whose	
votes	 are	 inconsequential,	 all	 opt	 for	 the	 socially	more	desirable	 equal	 allocation.	Our	
findings	on	the	behavior	of	these	Voters	3	are	more	consistent	with	experimental	results	
by	Tyran	(2004),	who	finds	that	many	voters	“bandwagon,”	i.e.,	vote	for	the	option	that	
they	expect	(or	know)	the	majority	of	other	voters	to	vote	for.		
A	final	question	arises	as	a	result	of	our	main	finding	that	pivotality	increases	the	
blame	 for	 the	unequal	 allocation:	Do	 those	 voters	who	 reveal	 their	 preference	 for	 the	
unequal	allocation	avoid	being	pivotal	 for	 the	unequal	allocation?	 In	our	game,	 in	case	
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Voter	1	opts	for	the	unequal	allocation,	do	some	Voters	2	“delegate”	the	pivotal	vote	by	
strategically	opting	for	the	equal	allocation?		
Recall	that	we	used	the	strategy	method	for	voters.	This	allows	us	to	address	the	
question	 above,	 as	 we	 can	 compare	 voters’	 decisions	 across	 decision	 nodes.	 In	
particular,	 we	 are	 interested	 in	 those	 voters	 who	 opt	 for	 the	 unequal	 allocation	 as	
decisive	 Voter	 3	 (i.e.,	 in	 situations	 in	 which	 Voters	 1	 and	 2	 opted	 for	 different	
allocations).	 Observing	 a	 voter’s	 choices	 at	 these	 decision	 nodes	 provides	 us	 with	 a	
measure	 of	 her	 preference	 over	 the	 two	 allocations.	 Note	 that	 a	 voter	 is	 even	 pivotal	
(and	 thus	 blamed	most)	 when	 she	 votes	 for	 the	 unequal	 allocation	 at	 these	 decision	
nodes.	Among	our	72	voters,	43	always	chose	 the	unequal	allocation	as	Voter	3	when	
their	choice	was	decisive.	9		The	respective	column	in	Table	4	shows	the	voting	behavior	
of	these	43	voters	separately.	We	find	that	20.9	percent	of	these	voters	(9	of	43)	opted	
for	 the	 equal	 allocation	 as	 Voter	 2	 subsequent	 to	 Voter	 1	 voting	 for	 the	 unequal	
allocation.	This	means	 that	 they	delegate	 the	pivotal	 choice	 to	 the	subsequent	voter—
potentially	in	the	hope	that	the	last	voter	will	secure	the	unequal	allocation	and	take	the	
blame.10	We	summarize	this	last	observation	in	the	following:	 	
																																																								
9	Voter	3’s	choice	is	decisive	at	two	decision	nodes.	We	consider	only	those	43	voters	who	revealed	twice	
and	 thus	 consistently	 that	 they	prefer	 the	unequal	 allocation	at	 these	decision	nodes.	Ten	voters	opted	
only	once	for	the	unequal	allocation	 in	 the	role	of	 the	decisive	Voter	3.	 If	we	took	them	into	account	as	
well,	the	fraction	of	voters	who	delegate	would	slightly	increase	to	23	percent	(12	out	of	53).		
10	 Table	 4	 further	 shows	 that	 the	 43	 voters	 whom	 we	 classify	 as	 having	 a	 preference	 for	 the	 unfair	
allocation	 based	 on	 their	 decisive	 vote	 as	 Voter	 3,	 also	 vote	more	 frequently	 than	 the	 other	 voters	 for	
“unequal”	in	the	roles	of	Voter	1	and	2.	23.3	percent	of	the	43	voters	vote	for	“equal”	as	Voter	1,	a	behavior	
that	is	consistent	with	the	idea	that	these	voters	prefer	to	delegate	the	vote	for	the	unequal	allocation	to	
subsequent	voters.	18.6	percent	of	the	43	voters	vote	for	“equal”	in	the	role	of	Voter	2	if	Voter	1	voted	for	
“equal.”	This	behavior	could	be	interpreted	as	an	aversion	for	being	the	first	voter	to	vote	for	“unequal.”	
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Result	3	(Pivotality	and	Voting	Behavior):	About	one‐fifth	of	 those	voters	
who	reveal	their	preference	for	the	unequal	allocation	when	their	vote	as	the	
last	 voter	 is	 decisive	 avoid	 being	 pivotal	 for	 the	 unequal	 allocation	 as	 the	
second	voter	and	delegate	the	pivotal	choice	to	the	subsequent	voter.	
	
5. Conclusion	
In	 this	 paper,	 we	 addressed	 the	 question	 of	 responsibility	 attribution	 for	 individual	
members	 of	 collective	 decisions	 making	 entities,	 such	 as	 committees	 or	 boards.	 In	
particular,	we	analyzed	whether	people	are	blamed	for	being	pivotal	if	they	implement	
an	 unpopular	 outcome	 in	 a	 sequential	 voting	 process.	 We	 measured	 responsibility	
attribution	 by	 assigned	 punishment	 points	 in	 an	 experimental	 voting	 game.	Our	main	
result	 is	 that	 pivotal	 decision	makers	 are	 blamed	 significantly	more	 than	 non‐pivotal	
decision	makers.	This	finding	lends	support	to	Shapley	and	Shubik’s	(1954)	assumption	
that	 the	 pivotal	 voter	 in	 a	 collective	 decision	 “is	 given	 credit”	 for	 having	 passed	 the	
decision.	Our	 results	 contribute	 to	a	better	understanding	of	 responsibility	attribution	
for	 collective	 decision	 making	 in	 general	 and	 they	 have	 specific	 implications	 for	 the	
theoretical	work	on	committee	decisions,	as	they	question,	for	example,	the	equivalence	
of	transparent	sequential	and	simultaneous	voting	procedures	(see	e.g.	Levy,	2007).	
Our	 experiment	 also	 showed	 that	 about	 one‐fifth	 of	 voters	 who	 revealed	 a	
preference	for	the	unequal	allocation	in	the	situation	where	their	vote	as	the	last	voter	is	
decisive	 opt	 for	 the	 equal	 allocation	 as	 the	 second	 voter	 subsequent	 to	 the	 first	 voter	
voting	 for	 the	 unequal	 allocation.	 This	 observation	 suggests	 that	 some	 voters	
strategically	delegate	the	pivotal	decision	to	subsequent	voters.	Our	study	thus	extends	
existing	 experimental	 results	 by,	 e.g.,	 Hamman	 et	 al.	 (2010),	 (Coffman,	 2011),	 and	
Bartling	and	Fischbacher	(2012),	who	show	that	many	subjects	shirk	the	responsibility	
for	unpopular	decisions	by	delegating	the	decision	right.		
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The	 strength,	 and	 maybe	 the	 weakness,	 of	 our	 experimental	 design	 is	 that	 it	
reduces	 the	decision‐making	 context	 to	one	 that	 renders	pivotality	very	 salient.	While	
this	 helps	 isolate	 the	 effect	 of	 pivotality	 on	 responsibility	 attribution,	 the	 voting	 that	
actually	 takes	place	 in	collective	decision‐making	entities	outside	 the	 laboratory	has	a	
richer	set	of	characteristics	than	our	sequential,	simple	majority	voting	game	over	two	
given	outcomes.	For	 instance,	 recent	results	by	Duch	et	al.	 (forthcoming)	 indicate	 that	
other	 factors,	 such	 as	 proposal	 power	 and	 voting	 shares,	 are	 also	 important	 for	
responsibility	attribution.		
Moreover,	our	study	focuses	on	a	sequential	voting	game,	whereas	many	voting	
processes	exist	where	votes	are	cast	simultaneously.	However,	our	results	on	the	effect	
of	pivotality	on	responsibility	attribution	might	be	relevant	also	for	simultaneous	voting	
processes—in	particular	 if	decision	makers’	preferences	over	proposals	are	known.	 In	
the	 context	of	our	game,	 consider,	 for	example,	 a	 situation	where	 it	 is	publicly	known	
that	voter	“U”	strongly	favors	the	unequal	allocation	and	that	voter	“E”	strongly	favors	
the	equal	allocation.	There	is	also	a	voter	“P”,	but	the	only	public	knowledge	is	that	she	
has	neither	a	strong	preference	 for	 the	equal	allocation	(like	voter	 type	E)	nor	 for	 the	
unequal	allocation	(like	voter	type	U).	Suppose	further	a	committee	of	three	voters	that	
consists	of	one	U,	one	E,	and	one	P.	Now,	even	with	a	secret	and	simultaneous	vote,	it	is	
clear	 that	 P	 is	 the	 pivotal	 voter	 who	 tips	 the	 scales.	 Suppose	 the	 unequal	 allocation	
results.	 Then,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 U	 might	 be	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 most	 blameworthy	
“type”	 as	 it	 is	known	 that	 she	has	 the	 strongest	preference	 for	 the	unequal	 allocation.	
While	the	voting	outcome	reveals	that	P	tends	more	towards	the	unequal	than	towards	
the	 equal	 allocation,	 she	 is	 nevertheless	 not	 type	 U,	 and	 thus	 potentially	 a	 less	
blameworthy	 “type.”	 Hence,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 behavioral	 economics	 models	 of	 “type‐
based”	reciprocity	(e.g.	Levine,	1998)	would	predict	higher	punishment	for	U	than	for	P.	
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Our	results,	on	the	other	hand,	predict	that	P	would	be	punished	for	being	pivotal,	which	
could,	in	principle,	lead	to	higher	punishment	for	P	than	for	U.		
One	 natural	 interpretation	 of	 the	 above	 situation	 is	 a	 left/centrist	 or	
right/centrist	 coalition	 in	 parliament,	 possibly	 with	 a	 small	 centrist	 party	 and	 larger	
“anchor	parties”	on	 the	 left	and	 the	right,	each	not	 large	enough	 to	pass	 legislation	on	
their	 own.	 How	 would	 constituents	 hold	 the	 coalition	 parties	 accountable	 for	 bad	
performance?	Our	result	on	the	impact	of	pivotality	on	responsibility	attribution	would	
suggest	 that	 the	 centrist	 party,	 which	 tips	 the	 scales,	 would	 be	 held	 responsible.	 But	
alternative	responsibility	attribution	heuristics	that	are	discussed	in	the	political	science	
literature,	such	as	proposal	power	or	voting	weights	(Duch	et	al,	2015),	would	suggest	
that	the	respective	larger	anchor	party	would	be	held	responsible	as	it	typically	also	has	
proposal	 power.	 The	 example	 shows	 that	 it	 will	 be	 interesting	 to	 further	 explore	 in	
future	research	how	people	assign	responsibility	in	collective	decision	making	contexts,	
and	 how	 this	 depends	 on	 the	 specific	 features	 of	 the	voting rules and the nature of the 
information available.	
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Online Appendix  
Pivotality and Responsibility 
Attribution in Sequential Voting 
Björn Bartling Urs Fischbacher Simeon Schudy 
 
1. Controllability and punishment behavior  
In this appendix, we discuss how the punishment predictions derived from the formal 
economic theories of social preferences in the main text relate to psychological concepts 
of attribution (Heider, 1958; Jones et al., 1972; Weiner, 1986, 1995). Attribution theory 
focuses on the relationship between outcomes and the perceived causes of the outcome 
and assumes that perceived causes of events share common properties. One of these 
properties (among others) is “controllability” (Weiner, 1979), i.e., the extent to which a 
person was in control of causing a particular outcome. In this appendix, we consider 
three different conceptualizations of controllability in the context of our voting game 
and investigate their ability to explain the observed punishment behavior. The first 
conceptualization of controllability captures whether or not a person was in control in 
the sense of being able to prevent the unequal outcome. The second conceptualization 
captures whether or not a person was able to implement the unequal outcome. The third 
conceptualization is based on the of a person’s degree of decisiveness. For all three 
conceptualizations we focus on cases in which the respective voter chose the unequal 
allocation and the unequal outcome occurred (as we do in our analysis of the 
punishment motive pivotality).  
Consider first the conceptualization of controllability that captures the ability of a 
voter to prevent the unequal outcome (see column 3 of Table A1 “Prevention”). Under 
2 
 
this conceptualization, Voter 1 has a low level of control in our voting game because she 
cannot prevent the unequal outcome: even if she votes “equal,” Voters 2 and 3 might 
vote “unequal” in which case the unequal allocation is implemented. If Voter 1 voted for 
the unequal allocation, also Voter 2 has a low degree of control because Voter 2 cannot 
prevent the unequal outcome: even if she votes “equal,” Voter 3 might vote “unequal” in 
which case the unequal allocation is implemented. In contrast, if Voter 1 voted for the 
equal allocation, Voter 2 has the highest degree of control, because by voting for the 
equal allocation she can now prevent the unequal outcome. If the outcome is already 
determined by the votes of Voters 1 and 2, Voter 3 has no control. But if Voters 1 and 2 
voted for diverging allocations, Voter 3 has the highest degree of control because now 
she can prevent the unequal outcome. Comparing column 3 to the rightmost column in 
Table A1 shows how the punishment motives presented in Section 3 of the main text 
correspond to the conceptualization of controllability based on prevention. Figure A1 
illustrates that actual punishment co-varies in the predicted way with this first 
conceptualization of controllability. 
 
Table A1: Different conceptualizations of controllability 
Voter 
Voting 
sequence 
Measures of Control Punishment 
motives from 
Section 3 Prevention Implementation Decisiveness 
1 u –…–… Low Low Low Intention unkind 
2 
u – u –… Low High 
Intermediate 
Pivotal 
e – u –… High Low Intention unkind 
3 
u – u – u 
No No No 
Choice unequal 
e – e – u Choice unequal 
u – e – u 
High High High 
Pivotal 
e – u – u Pivotal 
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Figure A1: Mean punishment for the different degrees of the ability to “prevent” the 
unequal outcome, given the unequal outcome results.  
 
Consider next the second conceptualization of controllability, based on the ability 
to implement the unequal outcome. Again, Voter 1 has a low level of control because she 
cannot implement the unequal outcome: even if she votes for the unequal allocation, 
Voters 2 and 3 might vote for the equal allocation, which would then be implemented. If 
Voter 1 voted for the equal allocation, also Voter 2 has a low degree of control, because 
she cannot implement the unequal outcome in this case. But if Voter 1 voted for the 
unequal allocation, Voter 2 has the highest degree of control because she can now 
implement the unequal outcome. Voter 3 has again either no control or the highest 
degree of control, depending on the preceding votes by Voters 1 and 2. Figure A2 
illustrates that also this second conceptualization of controllability corresponds to 
average punishment received by the voters as predicted by the theory. 
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Figure A2: Mean punishment for the different degrees of the ability to “implement” the 
unequal outcome, given the unequal outcome results.  
 
Consider finally the third conceptualization of controllability, which 
differentiates between a voter’s ability to implement only one of the outcomes and the 
ability to implement any outcome. This conceptualization is meant to capture the 
”degree of decisiveness” and differs from the two preceding ones insofar as it assigns the 
same (intermediate) level of control to Voter 2 independently of Voter 1’s votes (see 
Table A1, column 5 “Decisiveness”). If Voter 1 voted for the unequal allocation, Voter 2 
can only implement the unfair outcome but not the fair one, hence her level of control is 
only intermediate. (Similarly, if Voter 1 voted for the fair allocation, Voter 2 could only 
implement the fair but not the unfair allocation.) Our third conceptualization keeps the 
features that Voter 1 has a low level of control because she can neither prevent nor 
implement the unequal outcome and that Voter 3 has either no control (if the outcome is 
already determined) or the highest degree of control (if Voters 1 and 2 voted for 
diverging allocations). In the latter case, Voter 3 has the highest degree of control (and 
not only an intermediate one) because she can implement either the fair or the unfair 
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allocation. That is, she has a higher degree of decisiveness than Voter 2. Figure A3 shows 
that also this third conceptualization of controllability correlates positively with the 
punishment points received by voters.  
 
Figure A3 Mean punishment for the different degrees of “decisiveness”, given the 
unequal outcome results.  
 
Table A2 complements our econometric analysis from Table 3 on the different 
punishment motives by adding controllability as an explanatory variable that takes on 
values 0, .5, .75, and 1 for the respective degrees of control (no, low, intermediate, high), 
as specified in Table A1. As Figures A1, A2 and A3 suggest, all variants of controllability 
correlate positively with the received punishment. Models (A1), (A2), and (A3) in Table 
A2 show that this relation is statistically significant.  
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Table A2: An econometric comparison of different punishment motives 
OLS  (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) 
Outcome unequal    0.048 0.048 
    (0.070) (0.070) 
Choice unequal    0.782*** 0.782*** 
    (0.137) (0.137) 
Intention unkind    0.517** 0.517** 
    (0.197) (0.197) 
Outcome unequal     -0.135 -0.135 
x Intention unkind    (0.251) (0.251) 
Pivotal    0.318** -0.021 
    (0.152) (0.171) 
Controllability 2.053***   0.679***  
(prevention) (0.220)   (0.171)  
Controllability  1.904***    
(implementation)  (0.208)    
Controllability   0.730***  0.339*** 
(decisiveness)   (0.079)  (0.085) 
Constant 0.406*** 0.401*** 0.420*** 0.083** 0.083** 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.037) (0.037) 
Observations 1,728 1,728 1,728 1,728 1,728 
R2 0.209 0.211 0.209 0.284 0.284 
Notes: The dependent variable is punishment points for voters. Outcome unequal is a dummy 
variable which equals 1 if the unequal allocation is chosen. Choice unequal is a dummy variable 
which equals 1 if a voter opts for the unequal allocation. Intention unkind is a dummy variable 
which equals 1 if a voter opts for the unequal allocation and no majority was reached before 
her vote. Pivotal is a dummy variable which equals 1 if a voter is pivotal for the unequal 
allocation. Controllability refers to a variable that can take on the values 0, .5, .75 and 1 for the 
respective degrees of control (no, low, intermediate, high control), as specified in Table A1. 
Standard errors, clustered on 72 individuals, are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Model (A4) corresponds to regression model (6) from Table 3 in the main text 
but adds our first controllability measure based on prevention. The model shows that 
“Choice unequal,” “Intention unkind,” “Pivotality,” and “Controllability” matter 
significantly for the assignment of punishment. Our second controllability measure that 
is based on whether or not a voter could implement the unequal outcome is a linear 
combination of unkind intention and pivotality. Thus, it does make sense to add it to 
regression model (6). Finally, model (A5) adds our third controllability measure that 
distinguishes between different degrees of “decisiveness” to regression model (6). Recall 
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from Table 1 in the main text that punishment is particularly high for the pivotal Voter 3, 
compared to the pivotal Voter 2. Since our third conceptualization of controllability 
differentiates between a Voter 2 who votes for the unequal allocation (subsequent to 
Voter 1 voting for the unequal allocation) and a Voter 3 who votes for the unequal 
allocation (subsequent to diverging votes by Voters 1 and 2), controllability explains 
more of the variation than the Pivotality dummy. Since the latter correlates strongly 
with the controllability measure, it is not significant in regression model (A5) any 
longer.  
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2.  English version of the original German Instructions  
We present a full translation of the instructions for participants A and indicate the 
respective differences with respect to instructions for participants B with “[ ]”.  
 
 
General Information 
 
 
We cordially welcome you to this economic study. 
 
If you read the following instructions carefully, you will be able to earn money in 
addition to the 12 Swiss Francs that you receive for participating in this study. The 
actual amount you will earn depends on your decision and others decisions. Therefore it 
is important that you read the instructions carefully. If you have any questions, please 
let us know. 
During the study you are not allowed to talk to any other participant. If you break 
the no communication rule we may exclude you from the experiment and payments. 
In the experiment we do not talk about Swiss Francs, we talk about Points. The numbers 
of points you earn in the experiment are converted into Swiss francs with the following 
exchange rate.  
1 Point = 3 Swiss Francs  
After the study is finished you will receive the number of points earned in the 
experiment converted into Swiss Francs plus 12 Swiss Francs for participating in cash. 
The following pages will explain the experiment in detail. 
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The Study 
At the beginning 5 other participants of this study are randomly and anonymously assigned to 
you. You will not learn the identity of these participants, neither before nor after the study. 
Also, no other participant will learn your identity. The study consists of one round. This 
means every participant makes her decisions once.  
There are two types of participant, Type A and Type B.  
You are Type A. [B] 
Every group consists of three participants A and three participants B. Thus, you have been 
assigned two [three] participants A and three [two] participants B.  
In this study, the three participants A decide by majority rule, how 30 points are 
allocated between the three participants A and the three participants B. 
Participants A have to decide between two possible allocations of points: 
 Allocation 1: Participants A receive 9 points each and participants B receive 1 
point each. 
 Allocation 2: Participants A and participants receive 5 points each. 
The following table shows the two allocations between which participants A have to decide. 
 A A A B B B 
Allocation 1 
9 9 9 1 1 1 
Allocation 2 
5 5 5 5 5 5 
The allocation which receives the majority of votes will be implemented. This means if 
two or three participants A vote for allocation 1, allocation 1 will be implemented. If two or 
three participants A vote for allocation 2, allocation 2 will be implemented.  
Abstention is not possible. Each participant A hast to choose either allocation 1 or allocation 
2. 
10 
 
The voting procedure: 
Participants A vote one after another.  
1. The Participant A, who decides first, is called A1. 
2. The participant A, who votes second, is called A2. Before Participant A2 
decides, she observes the decision of participant A1  
3. The participant A, who votes last, is called A3. Before Participant A3 decides, 
she observes the decision of participant A1 and A2. 
The allocation for which at least two participants A voted is implemented. 
The voting result is known, as soon as two participants A have voted for the same allocation.  
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Decisions by Participants B: 
Participants B do not only observe the result of the vote but also how each participant A has 
decided. This means participants B observe, how the first voter A1 decided, then how the 
second voter A2 decided and finally how the third voter A3 decided. 
Then participants B have the possibility to deduce points from the payoffs of 
participants A1, A2 and A3. One participant B will be randomly determined and may 
deduce up to 7 points in total from participants A.  
Deducing points causes a cost: If participant B wants to deduce points from participants A, 
she hast o give up 1 point to deduce up to a 7 points.  
It is possible to deduce between 0 and 7 points (integers only). As soon as at least on point 
is deducted, participant B incurs the cost of 1 Point. Deduction costs are 1 point, 
independent of the number of points deduced. 
For example, if participant B deduces 7 points from participant A3, A3’s payoff is reduced by 
7 points but also participant B’s payoff is reduced by 1 point.  
If participant B deduces 5 points from participant A1 and 1 point from participant A2, A1’s 
payoff is reduced by 5 points and A2’s payoff is reduced by 1 point but also participant B’s 
payoff is reduced by 1 point, although participant B deduced only 6 points in total.  
The only restrictions with respect to the deduction of points is that participant B can 
never deduce more than 7 points in total and that given the implemented allocation the 
payoff of participant A can never be reduced by more points than participant A owned. 
If for instance the implemented allocation is allocation 1 (9, 9, 9; 1, 1, 1), participant B cannot 
deduce more than 7 points from a participant A. If the implemented allocation is allocation 2 
(5, 5, 5; 5, 5, 5), participant B can deduce in total 7 points but never deduce more than 5 
points from a participant A. 
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Three examples: 
Example 1: 
Participant A1 chooses Allocation 1 (9, 9, 9; 1, 1, 1).  
Participant A2 observes A1’s decision and then chooses Allocation 2 (5, 5, 5; 5, 5, 5). 
Participant A3 observes A1’s and A2’s decisions and then chooses Allocation 1 
(9, 9, 9; 1, 1, 1). 
Hence, the voting result is Allocation 1 (9, 9, 9; 1, 1, 1). 
All Participants B observe which allocation was chosen as well as the individual voting 
decisions by A1 A2 and A3  
Participant B1 is randomly selected and can deduce points from participants A.  
B1 deduces participant A1 2 Points, Participant A2 5 Points and Participant A3 0 Points. 
This results in the following payoffs: 
 
 
Decisions by 
participants A 
Allocation 1 
is 
implemented 
Deduction 
points 
Deduction 
cost 
Payoffs 
A1 Allocation 1 9 2 – 7 
A2 Allocation 2 9 5 – 4 
A3 Allocation 1 9 0 – 9 
B1 – 1 – 1 0 
B2 – 1 – 0 1 
B3 – 1 – 0 1 
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Example 2:  
Participant A1 chooses die Allocation 2 (5, 5, 5; 5, 5, 5).  
Participant A2 observes A1’s decision and then chooses Allocation 2 (5, 5, 5; 5, 5, 5).  
Hence, the voting result is Allocation 2 (5, 5, 5; 5, 5, 5). 
Participant A3 observes A1’s and A2’s decisions and chooses Allocation 1 (9, 9, 9; 1, 1, 1).  
All Participants B observe which allocation was chosen as well as the individual voting 
decisions by A1 A2 and A3  
Participant B2 is randomly selected and can deduce points from participants A.  
B1 deduces participant A1 2 Points, Participant A2 1 Points and Participant A3 2 Points. 
This results in the following payoffs: 
 
 
Decisions by 
participants A 
Allocation 2 
is 
implemented 
Deduction 
points 
Deduction 
cost 
Payoffs 
A1 Allocation 2 5 2 – 3 
A2 Allocation 2 5 1 – 4 
A3 Allocation 1 5 2 – 3 
B1 – 5 – 0 5 
B2 – 5 – 1 4 
B3 – 5 – 0 5 
 
Example 3:  
Participant B3 is randomly selected and can deduce points from participants A. 
Participant B3 deduces no points from any participant A. Participant B3 thus incurs no 
deduction cost.  
Thus, the points resulting from the implemented allocation are equivalent to the payoffs. 
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[This page appeared only in instructions for participants A] 
Your decisions as Participant A:  
Before you learn whether you are participant A1, A2 or A3 we ask you to state how you 
would decide in each possible situation in the role of participant A1, in the role of participant 
A2 and in the role of participant A3. 
 
There are seven possible situations in which a participant A may decide: 
 
If you are participant A1, you will  
1. Decide whether you choose Allocation 1 or Allocation 2.  
If you are participant A2, you will  
2. decide for the case in which participant A1 has chosen Allocation 1 whether 
you choose Allocation 1 or Allocation 2.  
3. decide for the case in which participant A1 has chosen Allocation 2 whether 
you choose Allocation 1 or Allocation 2.  
If you are participant A3, you will  
4. decide for the case in which A1 and A2 have both chosen Allocation 1 whether 
you choose Allocation 1 or Allocation 2.  
5. decide for the case in which A1 and A2 have both chosen Allocation 2 whether 
you choose Allocation 1 or Allocation 2.  
6. decide for the case in which A1 has chosen Allocation 1 and A2 has chosen 
Allocation 2 whether you choose Allocation 1 or Allocation 2.  
7. decide for the case in which A1 has chosen Allocation 2 and A2 has chosen 
Allocation 1 whether you choose Allocation 1 or Allocation 2.  
In this study we ask you to state for each of the seven situations how you would 
decide! 
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[This page appeared only in instructions for participants A] 
If you (and the other participants A) have decided for each situation, participants A 
will be randomly assigned the role of A1, A2 and A3. 
The allocation which results from the decisions stated by the three participants A will be 
implemented.  
Thus if you are assigned the role A1, the decision you stated as A1 will be implemented. 
If you are assigned the role A2, the decision you stated as A2 for the relevant case will be 
implemented. Which of the two decisions you stated as A2 will be implemented depends 
on the decision of the participant who was assigned the role of A1. 
If you are assigned the role A3, the decision you stated as A3 for the relevant case will be 
implemented. Which of the four decisions you stated as A3 will be implemented depends 
on the decisions of the participants who were assigned the roles of A1 and A2. 
Hence, each of the seven decisions can be decisive for your payoffs at the end of the 
study.  
Since the study has only one round, you make each decision only once. 
Thus carefully think about your decisions in each situation!  
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[This page appeared only in instructions for participants A] 
After you made your decisions as participant A: 
 
After all participants A have made their decisions and after it has been randomly determined 
which participant A acts as A1 A2 and A3, the relevant decisions are implemented.  
All participants B are asked how they will decide if they can deduce points from participants 
A. Participants B see which decision participant A1 has made, which decision was made 
thereafter by participant 2 (given A1’s decision) and finally which decision participant A3 has 
made (given the decisions by A1 and A2 ). 
After all participants B made their decision, one participant B is randomly selected in each 
group, whose decisions are implemented. Deducing points causes deduction costs for this 
selected participant B. The costs for this participant B will amount to 1 point if the participant 
chose to deduce at least 1 point from a participant A and 0 points if the participant chooses 
not to deduce points. The other two participants B cannot deduce any points and therefore 
incur no deduction cost.  
After all participants B made their decisions the study ends. The points you earned in the 
experiment will then be converted into Swiss Francs and paid in cash to you in addition to the 
12 Swiss Francs, which you receive for showing up for the experiment.  
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[This page appeared only in instructions for participants A] 
The procedure on your computer screen: 
The screens in which you make your decisions are structured as follows.  
In the upper row you always see for which Role – A1, A2 or A3 you are deciding on the 
current screen. First you decide as participant A1.  
In the example screen below you are deciding in the role of participant A1: 
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[This page appeared only in instructions for participants A] 
After you have clicked “continue”, you can decide between Allocation 1 and Allocation 2. 
Please click on the field you want to choose using the mouse.  
 
After you have clicked the button for Allocation 1 or Allocation 2, you advance to the next 
Situation. In the next situation you are allocate a role again. 
 
On the next pages we explain another example. 
  
19 
 
[This page appeared only in instructions for participants A] 
After you have decided as participant A1 you decide in the role of participant A2.  
In the example screen below you are deciding in the role of participant A2 
 
Again, you confirm that you have seen in which role you are deciding by clicking the 
“continue” button. : 
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[This page appeared only in instructions for participants A] 
After you have clicked “continue”, you see first which decision was chosen by participant A1. 
In the example below, participant A1 has chosen Allocation 2 (5,5,5;5,5,5).  
 
You confirm that you have seen the decision by participant A1 by clicking the “continue” 
button. : 
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[This page appeared only in instructions for participants A] 
After you have clicked “continue”, you can decide. You can now – given the decision of 
Participant A1 – decide between Allocation 1 and Allocation 2. Please click on the field you 
want to choose using the mouse.  
 
After you have clicked the button for Allocation 1 or Allocation 2, you advance to the next 
Situation. Thus, if you decide in the role of participant A2 or A3, you will first learn the 
decisions by participant(s) deciding before you (i.e., A1 and if so A2). Only after you learned 
the decisions you can choose yourself.  
You decide once in the role of participant A1, twice in the role of A2 and four times in the 
role of A3 (see also page 7 of the instructions).Please note that you will first decide as 
participant A1, then as participant A2 and finally as participant A3. However, the order of the 
different situations in the role of A2 and A3 is random (the order does not necessarily 
correspond to the order on page 7). Please always be aware for which situation you are 
currently deciding. 
Do you have any questions? Please raise your hand we will come to your cubicle. 
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Comprehension Questions: 
Please answer the following comprehension questions. The questions ensure that you 
are familiar with the procedures of the study. Decisions and Numbers in the question 
section (as well as in all examples in the instructions) were chosen randomly. Your 
answers to the comprehension questions do not affect you payoff at the end of the study.  
1. Assume the following decisions by participants A and that the decisions of 
participant B1 are implemented. 
 
 As‘ Decision Resulting 
points? 
Deduction 
points by B1 
Deduction 
cost? 
Payoffs? 
A1 Allocation 1  0 –  
A2 Allocation 2  2 –  
A3 Allocation 1  5 –  
B1 –  –   
B2 –  –   
B3 –  –   
Please fill in the points resulting from the implemented allocation as well as deduction 
cost for B1 and payoffs for all 6 participants. 
2. Assume the following decisions by participants A and that the decisions of 
participant B2 are implemented. 
 
 As‘ Decision Resulting 
points? 
Deduction 
points by B2 
Deduction 
cost? 
Payoffs? 
A1 Allocation 2  2 –  
A2 Allocation 1  0 –  
A3 Allocation 2  1 –  
B1 –  –   
B2 –  –   
B3 –  –   
Please fill in the points resulting from the implemented allocation as well as deduction 
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cost for B2 and payoffs for all 6 participants. 
3. Assume the following decisions by participants A and that the decisions of 
participant B3 are implemented. 
 
 As‘ Decision Resulting 
points? 
Deduction 
points by B3 
Deduction 
cost? 
Payoffs? 
A1 Allocation 1  0 –  
A2 Allocation 2  0 –  
A3 Allocation 2  0 –  
B1 –  –   
B2 –  –   
B3 –  –   
Please fill in the points resulting from the implemented allocation as well as deduction 
cost for B2 and payoffs for all 6 participants. 
4. In question “3.“ Participant B3 chose to deduce 0 points.  
a. How many points could have been deduced by participant B3 in 
total? 
b. How many points could have been deduced by participant B3 for 
each individual participant A? 
c. How many points would have been received by participant B3 if she 
deduced at least 1 point (given the implemented allocation)?  
 
[Participants B were asked an additional question:] 
5. In the experiment, you have to enter 24 decisions about deducing points (8 situations 
with three possibilities to deduce points).  
a. For how many of the 8 situations are your decisions implemented?  
b. Which deduction cost do you incur if you are the randomly chosen 
participant B who can deduce points and you deduced at least one point from 
one of the participants A?  
After we have checked you answers it is reasonable to consider already how you 
will decide in this study. 
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[This page appeared only in instructions for participants B] 
Your decision as Participant B: 
Before you know whether you will be randomly selected to be the Participant B who may 
deduce points from participants A we ask you to state for each possible situation how you 
would decide as the randomly chosen participant B.,  
There are eight possible situations, for which you have to decide how many points you would 
like to deduce from the participants A.  
The eight situations the eight possible decision combinations of participants A: The following 
table shows the situations at one glance. 
 
      Sequence of decisions 
Situation Participant A1 chooses Participant A2 chooses Participant A3 chooses 
1 Allocation 1 Allocation 1 Allocation 1 
2 Allocation 1 Allocation 1 Allocation 2 
3 Allocation 1 Allocation 2 Allocation 1 
4 Allocation 2 Allocation 1 Allocation 1 
5 Allocation 1 Allocation 2 Allocation 2 
6 Allocation 2 Allocation 1 Allocation 2 
7 Allocation 2 Allocation 2 Allocation 1 
8 Allocation 2 Allocation 2 Allocation 2 
 
How to understand the table: Each row shows one situation. In situations 1 to 4 the 
implemented allocation is allocation 1. For example, Situation 3 means that Participant A1 
decided for Allocation 1, then participant 2 decided for Allocation 2 und finally Participant 3 
decided for Allocation 1. As another example, Situation 7 means that A1 decided for 
Allocation 2, then Participant A2 decided for Allocation 2 and finally Participant A3 decided 
for Allocation 1. 
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[This page appeared only in instructions for participants B] 
Thus in this study we ask you to indicate for each of the eight situations how many 
points you want to deduce from A1, A2 and A3. 
Please note: After you have stated for all eight situations how many points you want to 
deduce, one of the three participants B in your group will be randomly chosen and her 
decision for the actual situation will be implemented. Only this Participant B incurs a cost 
of 1 Point for the deduction of points (if she chose to deduce points). 
Based on the decisions of participants A one of the eight situations occurs. If you are then 
randomly chosen to be the participant B who may deduce points from participants A your 
deduction decisions for that situation will be implemented. 
 
To summarize:  
In each group one participant B will be randomly selected, who can deduce points. Only 
the points of this randomly selected Participant B will be implemented for exactly that 
situation that actually occurred due to the decisions of Participants A1, A2 und A3 (of 
the respective group). In each group, only the randomly selected Participant B incurs a 
cost of 1 Point (if she decided to deduct points).  
Since you do not know which situation will result and whether you are randomly 
selected, your decisions for each of the eight possible situations can be relevant for the 
payoffs at the and of the study.  
Since the study lasts only one round, you make every decision just once. 
Thus, please carefully think about your decisions for all situations. 
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[This page appeared only in instructions for participants B] 
The procedure on your computer screen: 
The screens in which you make your decisions are structured as follows.  
First, you will see the following screen.  
 
If you hit continue, you will observe how participant A1 decided. 
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[This page appeared only in instructions for participants B] 
After you clicked „continue“, you observe how Participant A1 decided.  
 
In the example Participant A1 has chosen Allocation 2.  
If you hit “continue”, you will observe how participant A2 decided. 
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[This page appeared only in instructions for participants B] 
After you clicked „continue“, you observe how Participant A2 decided.  
 
In the example Participant A2 chose Allocation 1 (after Participant A2 observed Participant 
A1’s decision).  
If you hit “continue”, you will observe how participant A3 decided  
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[This page appeared only in instructions for participants B] 
After you clicked „continue“, you observe how Participant A3 decided.  
 
In the example Participant A3 chose Allocation 1 (after Participant A3 observed A1’s and 
A2’s decision).  
If you hit “continue”, you will see which allocation results from participants As’ decisions. 
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[This page appeared only in instructions for participants B] 
After you clicked “continue”, you will see which allocation results from participants As’ 
decisions.  
 
In the example, Allocation 1 is implemented.  
If you click “continue”, the fields in which you can enter the number of points you want to 
deduce will appear. 
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[This page appeared only in instructions for participants B] 
After you clicked “continue”, the following screen appears. 
 
In case you are randomly selected as the participant B who can deduce points from 
participants A please...  
…fill in the number of points you want to deduct from Participant A1 in the upper field, 
…fill in the number of points you want to deduct from Participant A2 in the middle filed, 
and fill in the number of points you want to deduct from Participant A3 in the lower field. 
If you do not want to deduce points from a Participant A, you enter “0” in the respective 
field(s). If you have made your decisions, click the OK- Button on the lower right. As long as 
you have not clicked that button you may change your input in the fields. 
The screens for the other seven situations are similar to the one situation described in 
the example. Please note: The eight possible situations are displayed in random order! (The 
sequence thus has not to be as indicated on page 7.) Thus please be aware for which 
situation you are deciding! 
Do you have any questions? Please raise your hand and we will come to your cubicle to help 
you. 
